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1 Introduction 
Climate change has been described as a risk ‘multiplier’ exacerbating virtually 
all crises facing humanity in the 21st century,1 and thus requiring unprecedented 
levels of international cooperation. 2  International cooperation on climate 
change has a short, but rather eventful history. On other environmental matters 
– such as protected areas or freshwater – multilateral cooperation is only a 
relatively recent addition to well-established regulatory and governance 3 
arrangements at the national and regional level.4 Conversely, climate change 
efforts started at the international level, and only subsequently trickled down to 
the national and regional level. This peculiarity can be explained by the global 
nature of climate change and by the relatively recent scientific awareness of 
the problem. By comparison with other international regimes, therefore, the 
climate change regime is still a relatively new addition to the international law 
family, and an especially troubled one. Indeed, the history of international 
climate change law thus far may be likened to an odyssey. 
Since 1992 States have struggled to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ 5 The treaty laying the 
foundations of international climate change governance– the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)6  – does not 
contain much detail on action that Parties should undertake to achieve this 
objective. Instead the UNFCCC rather typically performs a ‘constitutional’ role,7 
                                                 
1  ‘Global Risks 2014’ (World Economic Forum), part 1 <http://wef.ch/GJkRdk> 
accessed 11 May 2017. 
2 David Archer and Stefan Rahmstorf, The Climate Crisis: An Introductory Guide to 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2009) 230. 
3 Drawing on Laurence E Lynn Jr, ‘The Many Faces of Governance: Adaptation? 
Transformation? Both? Neither?’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance 
(Oxford University Press 2012), the term governance is used in this paper to refer to the act of 
‘directing, guiding, or regulating’ states’ conduct or actions, including through the design of 
international processes and  institutions. Ibid, 49. 
4 In relation to protected areas, see e.g. Alexander Gillespie, Protected Areas and 
International Environmental Law (Brill 2007) 7–26. In relation to watercourses, see e.g. Ariel 
Dinar and others, Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, 
Negotiation and Cooperation (World Scientific Publishing Company 2013) 58–74. 
5 UNFCCC, Article 2. 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992; 
in force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’). 
7 For this use of terminology, see P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law 




sketching out a series of principles guiding Parties’ action, and an institutional 
framework for inter-state cooperation. 8  The main components of this 
architecture are a set of substantive obligations concerning the achievement of 
the objective of the Convention (i.e. the mitigation of climate change and 
adaptation to the adverse consequences thereof), and procedural obligations 
to enable the review of implementation of substantive obligations. Furthermore, 
the UNFCCC sketches a framework to enable international cooperation through 
the provision of finance, capacity-building and the exchange of information. The 
Convention only performs a limited ‘regulatory’ role, 9  envisioning the 
progressive development of a regulatory architecture through the adoption of 
protocols and the rule-making activities of treaty bodies.10 This approach is far 
from unusual, and may be rather regarded as established practice under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).11 
Only one protocol to the Convention has been adopted – namely, the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.12 The protocol was meant to phase out 
greenhouse gas emissions progressively, pursuant to a ‘targets and timetables’ 
approach13 similar to that embedded in the Montreal Protocol to the 1985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.14 The Kyoto Protocol, 
however, has not enjoyed the same success as its model treaty15 and largely 
failed to deliver the hoped for results. Its bifurcated approach to the 
differentiation between Parties’ obligations and almost exclusive reliance on 
developed countries efforts16 have been superseded by circumstances – most 
saliently, the dramatic increase of emissions in developing countries.  
As Parties squabbled over the means to either reform or replace the 
Kyoto Protocol’s architecture, international climate governance has 
progressively become a highly fragmented affair.17 This is exemplified by the 
                                                 
8 UNFCCC, Articles 3 and 7-11, respectively. 
9 For this use of terminology, see Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 7) 9. 
10 UNFCCC, Articles 7.1 and 17. 
11 Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ 
(2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law 623. 
12 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Kyoto, 11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
13 The conceptualization of a targets and timetables, as opposed to a pledge and review, 
approach to climate governance is operated in the works of Daniel Bodansky, starting with 
Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Emerging Climate Change Regime’ (1995) 20 Annual Review of Energy 
and the Environment 425. 
14  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 
September 1987, in force 1 January 1989). 
15 As noted most famously in Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply 
Global Public Goods (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 94–95. 
16 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3 and Annex B. 
17 The literature on this issue is vast. See for example: OR Young, The Institutional 
Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale (MIT Press 2002); Frank 
Biermann and others, ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework 
for Analysis’ (2009) 9 Global Environmental Politics 14; Cinnamon P Carlarne, ‘Good Climate 
Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law Away?’ (2008) 30 Law & Policy 
450; Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico and Michael Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and 
the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2008) 30 Law & Policy 423; Harro van Asselt, The 
Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and Management of Regime 




emergence of a multitude of law-making and governance processes outwith 
those designed by international climate change treaties.18 International climate 
change governance has in this connection been likened to the Cambrian 
explosion, whereby ‘a wide array of diverse institutional forms emerges, and 
through selection and accident a few are chosen’, and where the architecture 
designed under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is ‘particularly important’ 
but ‘not unrivalled’.19  
The implementation of climate change treaties has produced important 
results, when one considers the high level of compliance with Parties’ reporting 
obligations, and with the targets embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.20 Yet the 
action undertaken to date has doubtlessly been inadequate to tackle climate 
change, raising concerns about the adequacy of existing governance 
arrangements. 
After much tribulation, and the near collapse of the regime in 2009, the 
quest for better international cooperation on climate change resulted in the 
adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Expectations of this new treaty could 
scarcely be greater: the Paris Agreement is meant to provide a framework to 
improve international cooperation on climate change, and to keep the world 
within the global mean temperature change goal identified by scientists as 
safe.21 Yet, whether and how this important objective will be reached largely 
depends, on the one hand, on the supporting political will and, on the other, on 
the re-design of the international architecture for climate governance. These 
rather thorny matters hang in the balance of ongoing negotiations on the so-
called rule-book of the Paris Agreement, which are meant to conclude by the 
end of 2018.22 
This paper reflects on this ongoing process, in light on the evolution of 
international climate change law-making and governance to date, focussing on 
challenges that have faced the implementation of existing arrangements, and 
on the suitability of the Paris Agreement to address these. The paper follows a 
two-pronged approach. The first part reflects on international climate change 
law-making, and on practice since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The 
second part considers the shift in international climate change governance, 
from a ‘targets and timetables’ to a ‘pledge and review’ approach. Whilst the 
suitability of the latter approach to deliver the solution to climate change 
remains to be tested, this paper looks at the past of the climate regime, to gauge 
where the implementation of the Paris Agreement may lead, as well as to 
identify potential pitfalls lying ahead.  
                                                 
18 On the informalization of the climate regime, see Harro van Asselt, Michael Mehling 
and Clarisse Siebert, ‘The Changing Architecture of International Climate Change Law’ in Geert 
van Calster, Wim Vanderberghe and Leonie Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate 
Change Mitigation Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 5; and Duncan French and Lavanya 
Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to 
Somewhere’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 437, 446. 
19 Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ 
(2011) 9 Perspectives on Politics 7, 12. 
20  See Michael Grubb, ‘Full Legal Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s First 
Commitment Period – Some Lessons’ (2016) Climate Policy 1. 
21 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1(a). 
22 Decision 1/CMA.1 Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, 




2 International climate law-making and its complexities 
The Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus at the twenty-first conference 
of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC.23 The agreement was from the outset 
meant to be ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force’ under the UNFCCC.24 The issue of legal form, nevertheless, was an 
elephant in the room during much of the lengthy negotiation that lead to the 
adoption of the new agreement.25  
At one end of the spectrum, some Parties favoured a protocol. This is in-
keeping with the practice of seeking to perfect and further substantiate Parties’ 
obligations under framework conventions, such as the UNFCCC, by adopting 
ancillary treaties, commonly referred to as protocols.26 On the other end of the 
spectrum, other Parties were uneasy about the legal form of the Paris 
Agreement. The US had domestic political reasons to ask that the agreement’s 
legal form be left undetermined, so as to enable presidential ratification without 
Senate approval. 27  Other Parties too, however, were wary of the legal 
implications attached to encapsulating the new architecture enshrined in the 
Paris Agreement in a treaty.  
In spite of some initial confusion at the time of its adoption,28 the Paris 
Agreement is, without doubt, an international treaty. This conclusion is 
compelled by the fact that the agreement is endowed with typical features of a 
treaty. For example, the agreement is structured in articles and it includes 
standard treaty provisions concerning ratification, the depositary, and so on.29 
Most conclusively, the Paris Agreement has been treated as a treaty by its now 
174 Parties, which brought about its entry in force much earlier than anticipated, 
following a record-breaking ratification process.30 
                                                 
23 Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, 
Add.1, 29 January 2016). 
24 Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add, 15 March 2012), 2. 
25  Annalisa Savaresi, ‘UN Climate Change Negotiations: Last Tango in Paris?’ 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-climate-change-negotiations-last-tango-in-paris/> accessed 15 
December 2015. 
26 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard 
University Press 2011) 151–152. 
27 As noted, for example, in a hearing before the Environment and Public Works 
Committee of the United States Senate, Testimony of Julian Ku, Maurice A Deane 
Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra University School of Law “Examining the 
International Climate Negotiations” November 18, 2015, available at: 
<https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/29525f03-9fc4-4112-9488-
701f3dc1e8d1/ku-testimony.pdf> accessed 2 March 2018. 
28 As noted, for example, in Joust Pauwelyn and Lilliana Andonova, ‘A “Legally Binding 
Treaty” or Not? The Wrong Question for Paris Climate Summit’ <https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-
legally-binding-treaty-or-not-the-wrong-question-for-paris-climate-summit/> accessed 11 May 
2017; and Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement: A Primer’ 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/02/the-legal-character-of-the-paris-agreement-a-primer/> 
accessed 14 December 2015. 
29 Paris Agreement, Articles 20 and 27, respectively. See also reflections in Daniel 
Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 Review of European, 
Comparative & International Environmental Law 142. 
30  Christina Voigt, ‘On the Paris Agreement’s Imminent Entry Into Force’ 





In substance, the Paris Agreement is as an ancillary treaty to the 
UNFCCC – and possibly a protocol in anything but name.31 It hinges on the 
principles32 and institutional arrangements established by the convention,33 the 
implementation of which it is mandated to enhance.34 As such, the agreement 
is not expected to dismantle the pre-existing international climate change 
governance architecture, but rather to build upon it.35 While the core ingredients 
of the regulatory framework have remained the same – i.e. substantive 
obligations concerning mitigation and adaptation as well as procedural 
obligations to enable the review of implementation of these) – much of the 
normative content of the Paris Agreement is incompatible with the continued 
existence of the governance architecture established by the Kyoto Protocol. 
The agreement is nevertheless silent on the fate of the protocol and of the 
complex governance arrangements and obligations it established, which 
therefore hang in the balance.  
Another matter that engendered animated debate after the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement is whether or not it is ‘legally binding’.36 Again, there is 
scarcely any doubt that, as any other treaty, the Paris Agreement is formally 
binding upon its Parties. As with any other treaty, however, the scope of Parties’ 
obligations clearly depends on the language in each provision. Some provisions 
establish categorical obligations, such as, for example, the obligation to pursue 
domestic mitigation measures, or to submit ‘Nationally Determined 
Contributions’ (NDCs). 37  Others, instead, are expressed in non-categorical 
terms, like that concerning the move by developing countries towards emission 
reduction targets.38 Others again have a merely enabling character, and aim to 
facilitate internationally coordinated action, rather than prescribe it – such as, 
for example, the provisions on the joint implementation of Parties’ mitigation 
obligations.39 The contours of States’ obligations under the Paris Agreement do 
not however only depend only on the terms used in each provision. Parties’ 
interpretation of these provisions in the practice of implementation may turn 
what sound like hortatory provisions into a sophisticated web of reciprocal State 
obligations. Conversely, the practice of implementation may turn into dead 
letter what were seemingly construed as categorical obligations.  
The climate regime provides eloquent examples of both. One example 
of the first type of practice concerns the body of rules concerning REDD+.40 
                                                 
31 As argued also in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?’ 
(2016) 34 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 16, 20. 
32 Paris Agreement, Preamble and Article 2. 
33 Ibid, Articles 16-18. 
34 Ibid, Article 2.1. 
35 See e.g. Paris Agreement, Article 13.13 and Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016, 98. 
36 As noted, for example, in Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ 
(n 29). 
37 Paris Agreement, Article 4.2. 
38 Ibid, Article 4.4. 
39 Ibid, Article 6. 
40  The acronym stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation in developing countries, and the scope of activities covered was progressively 
expanded to cover also the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (hence the ‘+’). See Decision 




These rules have emerged in a tumultuous fashion, from a long string of 
decisions adopted by the UNFCCC COP, 41  which are ex se non-legally 
binding.42 These rules nevertheless detail a set of obligations, which are now 
understood to encumber Parties wishing to carry out REDD+ activities.43  
The Kyoto Protocol, conversely, features several examples of 
categorically formulated obligations that have progressively descended into 
irrelevance. The protocol targets and timelines for the progressive reduction of 
emissions in developed countries were multilaterally negotiated in a process of 
political bargaining, which was enshrined in treaty form.44 But even though the 
protocol unequivocally requires all developed country Parties to adopt 
successive targets over time,45 faltering political will has made it impossible to 
continue with this approach. The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol has 
never entered into force, which means that the targets enshrined in it are not 
formally legally binding on Parties.46  
Far from being unique to the climate regime, this fuzziness in sources 
and in the related normative content is a typical feature of MEAs. So-called 
‘autonomous institutional arrangements’ 47  have rendered MEAs living 
instruments into which, in Brown Weiss’s words, Parties ‘continuously breathe 
life and to which they give new directions by acting as informal legislatures.’48 
MEAs treaty bodies regularly perform a variety of law-making functions. At 
times these functions are an emanation of specific delegated rule-making 
powers.49 The rationale for entrusting treaty bodies to adopt such rules is to 
enable the periodical adjustment and review of technical details that would 
scarcely be suited to be embedded in treaty text.50 At other times, decisions by 
treaty bodies may be regarded as authoritative interpretation of the terms of the 
treaties, and the practice of implementation may render these decisions 
                                                 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 
March 2011), 70. 
41 These decisions are recalled in Paris Agreement, Article 5.2. 
42 As noted for example in Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1. 
43 As argued in Christina Voigt and Felipe Ferreira, ‘The Warsaw Framework for REDD: 
Implications for National Implementation and Access to Results-Based Finance’ (2015) 9 
Carbon & Climate Law Review 113; Christina Voigt, ‘Introduction: The Kaleidoscopic World of 
REDD’ in Christina Voigt (ed), Research Handbook on REDD+ and International Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2016); and Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of Safeguards’ in 
Christina Voigt (ed), Research Handbook on REDD+ and International Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2016).  
44 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.1 and Annex B.  
45 Ibid, Article 3.9. 
46 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Doha, 8 December 2012, not in force. 
47  See G Churchill and G Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ 
(2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law 623. 
48 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Rise or the Fall of International Law’ (2000) 69 Fordham 
Law Review 345, 352. 
49 See for example, Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.2. Compare also Churchill and Ulfstein (n 
29), 639. 
50 As noted in AE Boyle and CM Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 216; CC Shaffer and MA Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2009) 94 Minnesota Law Review 




obligatory.51 Establishing whether or not the decisions of treaty bodies impose 
obligations on Parties, therefore, requires context-specific assessment.52  
Even by the standards of MEAs, international climate change law is 
remarkable for its latitude. The UNFCCC COP, its subsidiary bodies53 and their 
homologues under the Kyoto Protocol 54  have been extremely prolific 
international law-making machines. They have adopted hundreds of decisions 
and established dozens of institutions, which together constitute one of the 
largest international environmental bureaucracies in existence. The treaty 
bodies of the climate regime have thus typically ‘amplified’ the terms of climate 
treaties, filling in their ‘open-textured’55 provisions with content. This has been 
done by adopting both hard rules that Parties are expected to uphold,56 as well 
as soft guidance. The latter may be regarded as ‘subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the Parties 
regarding its interpretation,’ pursuant to Article 31(3)(b) Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.57 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are therefore 
conspicuous examples of living international law instruments, and the 
negotiated expression of Parties’ consensus, enshrined in guidance adopted 
by treaty bodies, has become the backbone of the climate regime.58 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement marked the beginning of a new 
rule-making process, whereby Parties are expected to fill with content the open-
textured provisions in the treaty, through the adoption of its so-called rule-book. 
The total or partial shelving of the architecture built with the Kyoto Protocol and 
the building of the institutional and regulatory architecture envisioned in the 
Paris Agreement requires considerable adjustment in international climate 
change governance. This gargantuan reform process was always expected to 
take time and is no mean undertaking for bodies operating on the basis of 
consensus, in a process with almost 200 Parties, where institutional viscosity 
and ‘lowest common denominator outcomes’59 are the norm.  
Prolonged rule-making processes are standard practice after the 
adoption of constitutional treaties, 60  such as the Paris Agreement. 
Nevertheless, thus far, the process for the making of the Paris Agreement’s 
rule-book has been marked by much complexity and by a high level of 
                                                 
51 As suggested also in Boyle and Chinkin (n 50) 151–152. 
52 As pointed out also in van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling (n 17) 430.  
53 UNFCCC, Article 7.2(i). 
54 Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.4. 
55 This use of terminology is borrowed from Alan E Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the 
Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ (1999) 48 The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 901. 
56 Building upon specific mandates conferred upon them by the treaties, e.g. Kyoto 
Protocol, Articles 3.4 and 12.7.  
57 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 
1980) 115 UNTS 331. On the legal status of treaty bodies decisions, see Boyle (n 25), at 905 
and 903, respectively.  
58 As noted also in Duncan French and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and 
International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to Somewhere’ (2013) 25 Journal of 
Environmental Law 437, 445.  
59 As suggested also in Boyle and Chinkin (n 50) 159. 




controversy.61 The remarkable institutional complexity of the climate regime has 
nevertheless meant that even the matter of which subsidiary body does what 
in the drafting of the rule-book had to be painstakingly negotiated.62 The early 
entry into force of the Paris Agreement complicated matters further, forcing 
Parties to decide which tasks ought to be reserved to the treaty bodies of the 
agreement, and which could be overseen by UNFCCC treaty bodies.63 So, even 
though Parties gave themselves until the end of 2018 to agree on the Paris 
Agreement rule-book, the delivery of this crucial piece of the climate regime is 
proving difficult, and time is running short already. 
2.1 The role of non-state actors 
The Paris Agreement has conferred an enhanced role upon non-state actors in 
international climate governance.64 As with many other MEAs, non-state actors 
may attend meetings of the Parties, and although they cannot formally 
participate in international law-making, they may make submissions on matters 
under consideration by Parties.65 Over the years an increasingly large number 
of civil society organisations has made ample use of this prerogative.66  
In the lead-up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, however, much 
emphasis was placed on voluntary emission reductions by non-state actors, 
such as companies and subnational governments, as well as on their 
contribution to the provision of climate finance.67 This is understandable, given 
the prominent role of corporate actors in engendering the climate problem and 
in being part of the solution. 
Rather belatedly, therefore, the preamble of the Paris Agreement 
acknowledges for the first time in a climate treaty the importance to engage ‘all 
                                                 
61 As noted also in Jennifer Allan, Katherine Browne, Aaron Cosbey, Dina Hestad, Mari 
Luomi, ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin: Summary of the Fiji / Bonn Climate Change Conference’ 
(IISD 2017) <http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12714e.html> accessed 25 February 2018. 
62 Decision 1/CP.21 entrusts some issues to the COP serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies; others are entrusted to the 
body charged to prepare for its entry into force, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA); and others again to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.  
63 As reported for example in Anna Schulz et al., ‘Summary of the Marrakech Climate 
Change Conference, 7-18 November 2016, Marrakech, Morocco’ 12 Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin 689, 21 November 2016. 
64 Paris Agreement, Preamble and Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
paras 133-135. For an early reflection, see Harro van Asselt, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in 
Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance under the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 
Climate Law 91. 
65 UNFCCC, Article 7.6 and, Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.8.for an early analysis, see B 
Arts, The Political Influence of Global Ngos: Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity 
Conventions (International Books 1998). 
66  These submissions may be found at: 
<http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_non-party_stakeholders/items/7478.php> 
accessed 11 May 2017. 
67 See Lima-Paris Action Agenda and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action 
(NAZCA) platform launched in 2014. For an analysis, see Sander Chan et al., ‘Reinvigorating 
International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive Framework for Effective Non-state Action’ 
(2015) 6:4 Global Policy 466; and Sander Chan et al., ‘Strengthening Non-state Climate Action: 
A Progress Assessment of Commitments Launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit’ (London 




levels of government’ and ‘various actors’ in addressing climate change. 68 
Furthermore, while the UNFCCC already made generic reference to public 
participation in addressing climate change and its effects, and developing 
adequate responses, 69  the Paris Agreement specifically emphasizes the 
importance of enhanced public and private sector participation in the 
implementation of NDCs.70 These developments largely focus on non-state 
actors’ engagement in the making and implementation of climate change action 
at the national, rather than at the international level. Yet, developments at 
recent Party meetings clearly show that momentum is building for finding ways 
to expand the visibility and active involvement of non-state actors in 
international climate change governance.71 
An eloquent sign of this paradigm shift was the establishment of a 
dedicated local communities and indigenous peoples’ platform in 2016.72 The 
platform has been tasked with strengthening the knowledge, technologies, 
practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous peoples; facilitating 
the exchange of experience and the sharing of best practices and lessons 
learned; and enhancing the engagement of local communities and indigenous 
peoples in the UNFCCC process.73 Work towards the operationalization of the 
platform is still ongoing at the time of writing, yet the platform has opened up 
an unprecedented avenue for the formal involvement of non-state actors in the 
climate regime, which is reminiscent of similar developments which occurred in 
the context of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).74 The CBD 
is unique amongst MEAs for having attributed a formal role to indigenous 
peoples and local communities. 75  While it is too early to tell whether 
developments in the climate regime will take a turn similar to that observed 
under the CBD, this is a development which is potentially gravid with 
momentous consequences for law-making under the climate regime. 
2.2 Regime interplay and institutional cooperation 
Because of the breadth of its subject matter, the climate regime is especially 
prone to overlaps with other international regimes. 76  Parties to the climate 
regime have nevertheless historically been reluctant to engage in institutional 
                                                 
68 Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
69 UNFCCC, Article 6 
70 Paris Agreement, Article 6.8. 
71 As noted in Jennifer Allan, Katherine Browne, Aaron Cosbey, Dina Hestad, Mari 
Luomi (n 61). 
72  Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 
(2015), 135-136; and Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-second session, 
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cooperation. Even when they have done so, as, for example in the context of 
the Joint Liaison Group to enhance coordination between the UNFCCC, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification, very limited results have been obtained, based on the 
argument that the Rio Conventions have a ‘distinct legal character, mandate 
and membership’.77  
The Paris Agreement seems to have opened the way to greater 
institutional cooperation with other international bodies and processes which 
have a mandate relating to climate change. The COP decision adopting the 
agreement acknowledges the importance of liaising with international 
processes which deal with matters such as climate finance 78  and human 
displacement.79  
Furthermore, the Paris Agreement’s preamble has broken new ground 
by tracing explicit links between climate change and human rights law. The 
climate regime has thus become the only body of international environmental 
law to include a specific reference to Parties’ existing human rights 
obligations. 80  While such a reference does not impose new human rights 
obligations on States, it draws attention to the need to comply with existing 
ones. Although timid, this reference may have significant implications for the 
interpretation and further refinement of Parties’ obligations under the climate 
regime.81 
Indeed, after having unprecedentedly engaged in the negotiations for 
the Paris Agreement, human rights bodies have actively sought to influence the 
making of its rule-book.82 After a string of the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) 
resolutions emphasised the potential for human rights to ‘inform and 
strengthen’ climate change law- and policy-making, by ‘promoting policy 
coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes’, 83  the Office of High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has made a series of submissions 
on matters under consideration by the Parties to the climate regime, including 
gender, finance, the sustainable development mechanism and capacity 
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building.84 The OHCHR has furthermore facilitated the compilation of expert 
recommendations on climate change and human rights,85 and human rights 
bodies have started to work as institutionalized pathways to monitor and 
sanction human rights violations associated with climate change and the 
implementation of climate change response measures.86  
 
3 Turning international climate change governance on its head 
The Paris Agreement enshrines in treaty form the ‘bottom-up’ ‘pledge-and-
review’ approach to international climate governance which first emerged with 
the Copenhagen Accord.87 Ever since the ill-fated 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference, the climate regime has progressively moved away from 
the ‘top-down’ ‘targets and timetable’ model embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.88 
The new approach requires that Parties unilaterally declare the action they are 
willing to undertake, with international climate bureaucracy working as a notary 
collecting, and eventually enabling, the review of Parties’ pledged action. This 
‘hybrid’ architecture89 hinges on Parties’ NDCs, rather than on a set of targets 
enshrined in a treaty.  
The legal character of NDCs was the subject of much speculation during 
and after the negotiations of the Paris Agreement.90 Contrary to what some 
suggested at the time,91 NDCs can scarcely be regarded as binding unilateral 
acts, as they miss the ‘intention’92 or ‘will to be bound’. 93 Equally, given their 
unilateral nature, it seems unlikely that NDCs might qualify as subsequent 
                                                 
84  All submissions are available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/UNFCCC.aspx> accessed 11 
May 2017. 
85 The OHCHR hosted an expert meeting on climate change and human rights on 6 - 
7 October 2016 in Geneva. The Draft Recommendations elaborated at the meeting are 
available online at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/ClimateChange.aspx> 
accessed 2 March 2018. 
86 CIEL, ‘States’ Human Rights Obligations in the Context of Climate Change’ (CIEL 
2018) <http://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/HRTBs-synthesis-report.pdf> 
accessed 2 March 2018. 
87  Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 
March 2010. For this use of terminology, see Bodansky n 13. 
88 Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement’ (n 31) 6. 
89 This terminology is used in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, Lavanya Rajamani (n 
82) 214. 
90 See for example Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Key Legal Issues in the 
2015 Climate Negotiations’ (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions 2015) 
<https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-issues-brief-06-2015.pdf> accessed 11 May 2017; 
Jorge Viñuales, ‘The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination’ 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-i-of-ii/> 
accessed 11 May 2017. 
91 Vinuales (n 90). 
92 International Court of Justice, Nuclear Tests Case [Australia v France] ICJ Reports 
1974 253, para. 43. 
93  As argued also in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A Rejoinder’ 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-agreement-a-rejoinder/> accessed 20 April 2016. For this use 
of terminology see: International Law Commission, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral 




agreements between the Parties ‘regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions’ pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.94 Whilst Parties’ interpretation of the legal 
character of NDCs will only become clearer with the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, the provisions anchoring NDCs in the treaty provide some useful 
clues in this connection. Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement says: 
Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined 
contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation 
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.  
 
This provision clearly imposes obligations of conduct upon all Parties,95 
which are required to submit NDCs detailing action on how they plan to reduce 
their emissions, and by how much.96 This obligation of conduct97 is procedural 
in nature.98 Whilst no format for (intended) NDCs could be agreed ahead of the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement, the conference of the Parties, serving as the 
meeting of the Parties, is expected to adopt specific guidance on this issue.99  
Quite crucially, therefore, the Paris Agreement does not impose 
obligations of results, as the Kyoto Protocol did, to achieve specific emission 
reductions over a certain timeframe.100 Yet all Parties must contribute to the 
achievement of the global temperature goal envisioned in the Paris 
Agreement, 101  and NDCs will be the term of reference to assess their 
contribution to such a goal. The Paris Agreement does not entirely do away 
with a differentiated approach to Parties’ obligations, but it moves away from 
the static distinction between developed and developing countries drawn in the 
UNFCCC, replacing it with a rather more flexible ‘self-differentiation’ 
approach.102  
In many ways, the governance architecture envisioned in the Paris 
Agreement is very much akin to that embedded in other MEAs, like the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity and its so-called Aichi Targets,103 or indeed 
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in the Sustainable Development Goals.104 While the pursuit of these collective 
targets/goals is not the subject of enforceable obligations, the expectation is that 
the process of reporting on progress in achieving these targets/goals will 
engender a virtuous peer pressure circle, leading Parties to deliver the desired 
outcomes.105  
Generally, the provision of information is a crucial ingredient of MEAs, 
both to ensure the monitoring of the problems that Parties seek to tackle (in the 
case of the climate regime, the emissions of greenhouse gases), as well as to 
review Parties’ adherence to the substantive obligations they have undertaken. 
When compared with the other climate treaties, the Paris Agreement attempts 
to devise a more comprehensive system to review the effectiveness, 
implementation and compliance with Parties’ obligations.106  
Before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, in fact, differentiation in the 
climate regime did not only apply to Parties’ substantive obligations concerning 
emission reductions, but also affected procedural obligations associated with 
the review of implementation and compliance. Furthermore, the Kyoto 
Protocol’s sophisticated review mechanisms did not encompass the review of 
effectiveness of action. This in turn means that the Kyoto Protocol lacked the 
means to ‘ratchet up’ ambition over time, and align with recommendations 
received from scientists. 
Conversely, the UNFCCC includes only skeletal references to the review 
of implementation of Parties’ obligations. Since the Copenhagen debacle, 
however, decisions adopted by UNFCCC treaty bodies have progressively both 
increased Parties’ reporting obligations in frequency and expanded their scope, 
incorporating new elements, such as, for example, the provision of information 
concerning assistance to developing countries. 107  The review of 
implementation, however, has remained differentiated for developed and 
developing countries. 108  The implementation of these arrangements has 
evidenced some obvious shortcomings.109 First, the lack of a standard template 
to report pledged mitigation action hindered comparison between Parties’ 
efforts. 110  Second, developing countries struggled to comply with their 
increased reporting obligations under the UNFCCC,111 thus drawing attention to 
the need for dedicated assistance and capacity building. The review of 
effectiveness of action was unsuccessfully attempted with the so-called 2013-
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2015 Review, 112  but did not result in a process to adjust Parties’ level of 
ambition. 
The Paris Agreement is expected to build and expand on existing review 
procedures under the UNFCCC,113 and to address their shortcomings. Its rule-
book is expected to standardize the reporting of information for all Parties, 
largely doing away with the differentiation between developed and developing 
countries.114 A Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency is set to support 
developing country Parties in meeting their enhanced reporting obligations.115 
Most crucially, the Paris Agreement has, at least in principle, levelled the 
process for the review of implementation of Parties’ obligations in relation to 
mitigation, 116  establishing the premises for the creation of a machinery to 
periodically scrutinise these, at both the individual and the aggregate level. 
At the individual level, the review of implementation of the agreement 
will be coupled with an expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism. 117 
Even though the details of this mechanism remain to be determined, it seems 
clear that it will follow what has been described as a ‘managerial’, rather than 
an ‘enforcement’ model.118 Therefore, and in line with arrangements under other 
MEAs, the Paris Agreement will not so much coerce, but rather encourage 
compliance, enabling Parties’ consultation, cooperation and peer pressure. It 
seems doubtful that Parties will agree to equip this mechanism with the means 
to attach consequences to instances of non-compliance, as under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Yet, the very existence of a mechanism to consider questions of 
compliance for all Parties, rather than for developed ones only, is a major 
novelty.  
At the aggregate level, alignment with the temperature goal enshrined in 
the Paris Agreement will be periodically assessed, in the context of a so-called 
global stocktake exercise.119 This brand-new element in international climate 
governance is aimed to enable the review of effectiveness of Parties’ action 
and induce them to adjust the level of ambition in their NDCs over time.120 The 
global stocktake is crucial to ensuring that the bottom-up architecture 
envisioned in the Paris Agreement will deliver the results it was designed to 
produce. Even though global goals and targets are commonplace in MEAs, 
effectiveness review procedures to assess Parties’ alignment with the 
achievement of these are not. Therefore, it is presently hard to predict how the 
global stocktake will work in practice.  
Non-state actors can potentially perform an important role in this context, 
both by contributing to the provision of information, as well as by putting 
pressure upon Parties.121 The Paris Agreement is silent on this matter. Yet, 
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negotiations on the rule-book may open the door to greater involvement of non-
state actors, for example enabling in the review process, building upon 
precedents established with other MEAs.122  
Greater institutional cooperation with other international bodies may 
have implications for the review of implementation of Parties’ obligations too. In 
this connection, human rights bodies’ emboldened efforts to monitor and 
sanction human rights violations associated with climate change, and the 
implementation of climate change response measures mentioned above may 
be regarded as a promising development.  
 
 
4 Conclusion: what the past tells us about the future 
The Paris Agreement laid the foundations of a reformed international climate 
change governance architecture. This architecture hinges on a bottom-up, 
pledge and review approach and, at least in principle, relies on greater non-
state actors’ involvement and inter-institutional cooperation. Compared with the 
UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement is a great leveller of Parties’ obligations, in the 
sense that now all Parties are expected to reduce their emissions, and all are 
going to be subjected to a process for the review of implementation and 
compliance. Compared with the Kyoto Protocol, less pervasive substantial 
obligations under the Paris Agreement are compensated for by a universal 
commitment to emission reductions, as well as by a process for the review of 
effectiveness.  
From a law-making perspective, the adoption of the Paris Agreement 
has initiated a new complex rule-making season. This sees Parties engage in 
a collective exercise to fill in with content the provisions in the treaty concerning 
crucial elements of the new international climate change governance 
architecture, such as NDCs, and the procedures for review of implementation, 
compliance and effectiveness. The meeting of Parties and subsidiary bodies 
thus far has clearly shown how complex this whole endeavour is. In an ideal 
world, Parties would use this opportunity to simplify the remarkable institutional 
and regulatory complexity that plagues the climate regime, doing away with 
rules and institutions which are no longer needed. In reality, so far, rather than 
manage this complexity, some Parties have used it to throw a spanner in the 
works for the adoption of the Paris Agreement’s rule-book. 
From a governance perspective, it is vital that rule-making under the 
Paris Agreement delivers a robust framework to ensure adequate coordination 
between Parties’ actions. As is often the case with international law, the main 
purpose of the Paris Agreement is to put pressure on Parties to adopt measures 
at the national level suited to tackle a problem. While in and of itself international 
law cannot deliver the solution to the epochal challenge of climate change, it 
clearly plays an important part in engendering peer pressure to engage in 
delivering a solution. Notwithstanding the shift to a bottom-up, pledge and 
review approach, the job of international rules therefore remains the same: the 
delivery a robust architecture for the review of implementation, compliance and 
effectiveness, as well as the means to collaborate internationally, through the 
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provision of finance, capacity-building and the exchange of information.  
It would be naïve to expect the Paris Agreement to be a miraculous cure 
for all the maladies that have affected international cooperation on climate 
change thus far. Whilst the adoption of a new approach to international climate 
governance was a matter of political necessity, a change in architecture is not 
in itself a guarantee of success. Indeed, while the rhetorical value of identifying 
global goals is beyond dispute, their suitability to deliver concrete results is yet to 
be demonstrated. More generally, the Paris Agreement leaves unsolved a 
series of unpalatable political questions and complex technical details. The 
devil clearly is in these details, yet experience accrued with the implementation 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is a precious term of reference to assist 
with detecting the pitfalls lying ahead, and how to avoid repeating the mistakes 
of the past.  
The Paris Agreement has already marked some progress, by 
dismantling the differentiation firewall, replacing it with a more flexible 
approach, which is cognizant of the need to involve all Parties in tackling climate 
change. It also planted the seeds to establish processes for the review of 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness that involve all Parties. The 
Paris Agreement also seems to have opened up new avenues to involve non-
state actors in climate governance and to improve coordination and address 
synergies between international regimes with a mandate that is related to 
climate change. Indeed, when an issue has over-arching implications for a 
range of different international regimes, it seems wise to emphasise, and 
vigorously explore, avenues for coordination. All these elements seem to augur 
well, but only time will tell whether these auspicious signs marked a fresh start 
for a regime whose journey has thus far been anything but plain sailing.  
 
 
 
 
